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Abstract
This paper examines the determinants of credit allocation to renewable
energy ¯rms in developing and transition countries. Using a simple en-
dogenous growth model, we show that the development of the renewable
energy sector, i.e. the diversi¯cation of renewable energy resources used in
primary energy production, depends on the quality of ¯nancial intermedia-
tion, debtor information costs to banks, and ¯nancing needs of renewable
energy ¯rms. Policies should aim at increasing ¯nancial sector perfor-
mance through better institutional frameworks and improving ¯nancing
conditions for new energy ¯rms. The empirical analysis con¯rms the pos-
itive e®ect of ¯nancial intermediary development on the renewable energy
sector.
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Achieving a diversi¯ed and sustainable energy supply for future generations is
one of the major challenges for today's policymakers. But ¯nancing the neces-
sary energy projects is proving a serious obstacle to this goal. Over the next
twenty-¯ve years, global energy demand is projected to grow by nearly 60 per-
cent; more than two thirds of the increased demand will come from developing
and transition countries. Energy demand will continue to be covered mainly
by conventional fossil fuels, such as coal, oil, and natural gas, with over two
thirds of the energy-related pollution increase coming from the developing world
(IEA, 2005). Meanwhile, many estimates predict that oil and possibly natu-
ral gas production will plateau around the same time, casting doubt on future
energy security.1 Hence, achieving a sustainable energy supply requires diver-
sifying energy sources and changing the current dependence on non-renewable
and polluting hydrocarbon fuels.
However, energy projects generally demand high levels of ¯nancing, which
producers in less developed economies can rarely cover on their own; but ob-
taining su±cient investment to pursue energy diversi¯cation faces a number
of obstacles (World Bank, 1999; IEA, 2003). More precisely, the ¯nancing for
renewable energy technologies (RETs) is closely connected to the development
of the ¯nancial sector:2 on the one hand, energy sector privatisation and lib-
eralisation during the course of the 1990s have increased the contribution of
smaller private power projects, and at the same time induced a shift in exter-
nal ¯nancing from the local government and multilateral institutions to private
investors (Babbar and Schuster, 1998). On the other hand, renewable energy
(RE) projects have very high start-up costs relative to the expected monetary
returns, and very lengthy payback periods; they therefore typically require long-
term maturity loans (UNEP FI, 2004; Sonntag-O'Brien and Usher, 2004b).
Accordingly, the problem of ¯nancing RE projects is twofold: ¯rst, the avail-
ability of the long-term loans needed by RET ¯rms is positively linked to the
development of the banking system (DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999).
As a consequence, RE projects in less developed countries are at a particular
disadvantage.3 Second, RET ¯rms ¯rms have limited access to ¯nancing be-
cause RE projects compete against fossil fuel projects, which have a longer track
record, relatively lower up-front costs, shorter lead times, and often favourable
1The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2000) alone has published several
di®erent scenarios, with global oil production peaking between 2021 and 2112.
2Another important issue regards the institutional framework: as previous literature has
pointed out, limited ¯nancing of RETs derives both from the lack of a speci¯c policy de-
sign, and/or crowding-out e®ects from government policies favouring investment in fossil fuel
projects (Churchill and Saunders, 1989; Head, 2000; World Bank, 2002; Sonntag-O'Brien and
Usher, 2004b; UNEP FI, 2004). Institutional shortcomings also contribute to the often lim-
ited consideration by potential investors of the positive environmental externalities of RETs
in project development costs. In general, the perception that energy sustainability is not a
top priority for policymakers further lowers investors' willingness to ¯nance projects where
the foreseeable rewards are already relatively low and long in the coming.
3In less developed economies, the banking sector is the major source of external ¯nancing
(Tadesse, 2002; Carlin and Mayer, 2003; and Beck et al., 2004a), and access to bank credit is
a serious problem especially for small- and medium-sized companies (Beck et al., 2004b).
2political treatment (Churchill and Saunders, 1989; Head, 2000; World Bank,
2002; and Sonntag-O'Brien and Usher, 2004b).
It is worth noting that in both cases, underinvestment in RET ¯rms can
be interpreted in terms of imperfect information between ¯rms and ¯nanciers:
projects aimed at developing new technologies bear, almost by de¯nition, greater
information costs to investors, which are more easily borne by a highly devel-
oped ¯nancial sector. Where the latter is not given, the result may well be a
market distortion in favour of less risky investments, such as fossil fuel projects
and large-sized enterprises. This is consistent with the view that the devel-
opment of the domestic ¯nancial sectors is the crucial factor in meeting the
booming energy demand in less developed economies (Ishiguro and Akiyama,
1995; World Bank, 2003).4
Following this line of reasoning, the paper presents a multi-sector endoge-
nous growth model of the expanding-varieties type (following Gries et al., 2004;
and Romer, 1990), which explains the in°uence of ¯nancial intermediaries on
the development of RETs in developing and transition countries. The focus
is on the development of ¯nancial intermediaries|and especially the banking
sector and banks' role as evaluators of potential debtors|as a driving force in
the introduction of RETs in these countries. We assume imperfect information
between RE entrepreneurs and ¯nanciers, and show that high information costs
to determine creditworthy investment projects, and distortions in the banking
sector, have a negative impact on the expansion of the RE sector. Greater
RE development and economic growth in the model come from better ¯nancial
intermediation and lower information costs to banks, as well as lower external ¯-
nancing needs for RE entrepreneurs. Policies should therefore aim at improving
¯nancial sector performance in general and ¯nancing conditions for RE ¯rms
in particular, in order to foster the development of a diversi¯ed and sustainable
energy sector.
These theoretical ¯ndings are tested empirically in a series of panel data
regressions for 118 non-OECD countries. The empirical results are fairly en-
couraging: they con¯rm the positive e®ect of ¯nancial sector and particularly
banking sector development, as well as of power sector reforms, on the use of
RETs in developing and transition countries|especially the newer technologies
such as wind, solar, geothermal and biomass.
The paper is organised as follows. Section (2) contains the description of
the model and the resulting steady-state equilibrium; policy implications are
discussed in section (3) and the empirical results given in section (4); while
section (5) concludes.
4The notion that commercial ¯nancing plays an important role in RET expansion in de-
veloping countries is empirically con¯rmed by a number of case studies, for example on the
experiences in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
32 The model
The approach is based on a simple general equilibrium model of endogenous
growth with three sectors: ¯nal and primary energy production, and the bank-
ing sector. The focus is on the development of the renewable energy (RE)
sector in transition and developing economies. Experience in these countries
shows that renewable energy technologies (RETs) have typically been adopted
from developed countries and not been the result of domestic R&D. The model
therefore considers only the expansion of renewable energy resources and ¯rms
using already-developed RETs and does not include an R&D sector.
2.1 Final energy provision
We assume that there are N primary renewable energy producers in a given
country, each supplying energy derived from a di®erent RE resource Ri, e.g.
hydropower, wind, geothermal, photovoltaic and solar thermal, biomass, etc.,
to the ¯nal energy producer. Final energy is produced by means of labour and
primary RE resources Ri according to the following extended Cobb-Douglas






where 0 < ® < 1. Since the production function is homogeneous of degree one,
there will be constant returns to scale of all inputs taken together.5 Following
the basic idea of the expanding-varieties model, growth is driven by an expan-
sion in N (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004), i.e. a diversi¯cation in the primary
renewable energy sources. The latter is interpreted as bene¯cial for the sus-
tainable development of the energy sector: a larger number of RE resources
in primary energy production increases the share of RETs in a country's en-
ergy supply, and by implication diminishes the dependence on existing primary
energy resources used in energy production.
The ¯nal energy production sector behaves like a single competitive ¯rm,
which maximises pro¯ts according to




with Pi denoting the price of primary resource Ri and w the wage rate. This
implies a demand for primary RE resources given by
5The formulation used here also implies that the di®erent types of primary renewable
energy in a country are not perfect substitutes but have additively separate e®ects on a
country's energy supply. In a particular case, a new type of primary renewable energy i may
substitute for an existing one i
0, reducing its marginal productivity; but in ¯nite time, the






2.2 Realisation of primary RE production projects
Primary RE production is relatively capital-intensive. Planning and imple-
menting a new energy project, regardless of the type of resource used, is a very
costly enterprise. And because of the additional costs facing RETs|e.g. long
lead times, low levels of regulatory and ¯nancial support, and relatively high
production costs in a °edgling industry where economies of scale and learning
e®ects have only recently set in|renewable energy entrepreneurs in less devel-
oped economies are especially reliant on outside ¯nancing, as their own wealth
is unlikely to be su±cient to cover their investment needs.6
In the model, the RE entrepreneur has own wealth of W, which by assump-
tion is less than 1. He must therefore obtain 1¡W = Z units of ¯nancing from
an outside creditor in order to undertake a new energy project. If the credi-
tor decides to award the loan necessary to ¯nance the project, he will charge
periodic interest payments Zrl on the credit.
The main source of ¯nance for entrepreneurs in developing and transition
countries is the banking sector. We exclude the possibility of Ponzi schemes
by assuming that ¯rms revolve loans in¯nitely and service no more than the
interest payments (Gries et al., 2004). With rd denoting the bank deposit
rate, the present discounted value of the entrepreneur's setup costs is Vs(t) = R 1
t Zrle¡
R v






After obtaining the initial project credit from the ¯nancier, pro¯t °ows of pri-
mary energy producers may continue to be a®ected by the quality of the banks'
¯nancial intermediation. The level of banking sector distortion is captured by ¿,
which enters the pro¯t stream as an indirect "tax" on banking services provided
to the entrepreneur once he has been granted the initial loan. The "tax" rate ¿
depends on the legal and institutional environment and includes factors which
in°uence banks' lending ability such as currency taxes, as well as accounting
standards and the power of banks to draw up contracts.7
6Whether we consider a new investment project by an established ¯rm or the start-up of
a new energy ¯rm, ¯nancing needs in the energy sector are still likely to surpass own wealth.
For a study of the ¯nancing patterns of the energy sector in less developed countries, see
World Bank (1999).
7King and Levine (1993b) introduced a similar ¯nancial sector "tax" caused by market
distortions in their model. For empirical studies of indirect ¯nancial sector taxes, see Chamley
and Honohan (1990) and Giovannini and de Melo (1993). For more on institutions and
¯nancial intermediation, see La Porta et al. (1997), DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998),
Levine et al. (2000), and Beck et al. (2004a).
5In addition, the RE producer will have to pay costs of ± on each unit of
energy resource he uses. ± includes periodic costs of primary energy production,
e.g. maintenance costs for wind mills or photovoltaic panels. The primary
RE production sector cannot be described by a single ¯rm; instead, there is
a distinct ¯rm i which produces energy with each RE resource Ri. Once the
primary energy producer has secured the ¯nancing of his project, he can supply
his output to the ¯nal energy producer. In this form of monopolistic competition
between primary RE producers, the present discounted value of the in¯nite









t rd(s)ds: In the steady state, the interest rate rd is constant and the net






(1 ¡ ¿)Pi ¡ ±
¢
: (5)
The primary energy producer takes the demand curve for primary RE by the
¯nal energy provider (3) as given when choosing the pro¯t-maximising price
to set. Pro¯t maximisation gives the optimal primary resource price P, which







Using the optimal price P (6) and equation (3), and substituting them in (5)














Primary energy producers compete for bank credits to realise their projects;
setup costs must therefore equal the net present value of pro¯ts Vs = Vr. This













Equation (8) gives the equilibrium interest on loan payments that the RE pro-
ducers will be willing to pay the bank.
2.3 The banking sector
Banks keep deposits D and make interest payments to their depositors at rate
rd, and they allocate credits Q at the loan rate rl. Of potential RE entrepreneurs
applying for a loan, only a fraction Á will actually be creditworthy. However,
there is a critical situation of imperfect information between the possible debtor
6and the investor: the ¯nancier cannot directly observe the quality of the invest-
ment project. Instead, he has to evaluate the RET project's potential at cost
f before deciding on credit allocation. The reasoning is that although the en-
trepreneurs may observe their own potential costlessly, they cannot evaluate and
credibly communicate it to the ¯nancial intermediators.8 We assume that the
¯nancing constraints of RE entrepreneurs and information costs to ¯nanciers
are similar across di®erent RETs.
Banks are faced with a balance-sheet constraint which requires that total
assets|credits Q plus reserve holdings RD|equal total liabilities, i.e. deposits
D:
Q + RD = D: (9)
In this model, we concentrate on the market distortions a®ecting the ¯nancial
intermediation between banks and debtors, and assume that interbank frictions
are negligible and reserve holdings unnecessary. This means that RD = 0 and








Q ¡ rdQ: (10)
Pro¯t maximisation yields the bank loan supply of




The result corresponds to a situation with zero pro¯ts. Credit market equilib-
rium is given by Q = ZN.
2.4 Households
The model uses a standard description of consumer preferences. The represen-






e¡½tdt for ¾ 2 [0;1): (12)
½ denotes the rate of time preference, and 1=¾ indicates the intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution. The households' income will come from interest on de-
posits and wages and can be spent on consumption or savings (further deposits),
giving the following budget constraint
8See King and Levine (1993b), and Fazzari et al. (1988) for more on the importance of
imperfect information in new debt provision.
7Drd + wL = C + s = C + _ D: (13)





where °C = _ C=C is the equilibrium growth rate of consumption. In the steady
state, consumption and output grow at the same rate °C = °Y = °, and
rd = ° ¾ + ½.
2.5 Solution for the steady state
Combining the primary RE producers' loan demand (8) with the banks' optimal


















This steady-state growth rate applies to the number of primary RE ¯rms N,
as well as output Y and consumption C.
The most interesting aspects of the solution regard the signs of the terms
involving the banking and RE sectors. Banking sector distortions, captured by
¿, will negatively a®ect growth, as less e±cient ¯nancial intermediaries channel
part of ¯rms' pro¯ts away from growth-enhancing activities. Also, a higher
proportion of creditworthy investment projects Á will have a positive e®ect not
only on the RE sector's growth, but on the growth of the economy as a whole.
We further see that higher information costs f to the ¯nancier evaluating a
potential creditor will result in lower growth rates.
A higher dependence of the RE producer on external ¯nancing for a project
(a larger credit Z) is associated with a lower growth rate.9 Similarly, higher
resource costs to the primary RE producer ± will also result in less growth in
the RE sector and the economy overall. Finally, the model shows that a greater
willingness to save by the households|lower ½ and ¾|raises the growth rate.
Possible extensions regard the inclusion of positive production externalities,
e.g. better environmental quality and lower economic and social costs due to
pollution. Through speci¯c policies such as production subsidies and guaran-
teed feed-in prices, these bene¯ts can be internalised to lower the production
costs per unit of RE ±. Formally, this can be represented as ± = ±0 ¡ ², where
± is the net total periodic production cost per unit of primary RE resource.
9The higher the credit need of an entrepreneur, the lower the interest rate on the loan must
be for him to be able to undertake the project, according to equation (8). Banks will be less
willing to give a credit, depressing the overall growth rate.
8±0 includes the actual production cost such as equipment maintenance, while
² is the per-unit value of production externalities. It is easy to see that the
inclusion of these externalities in the equation would have a positive impact on
RE sector development.
3 Policy implications for RE sector development
The model's ¯ndings have several implications for the development of the re-
newable energy sector. We will discuss two main issues involving the banking
sector, and other important points regarding RE production costs and the ex-
ternal ¯nancing needs.
First, the cost ¿ is associated with ine±ciencies in the provision of banks'
services. Banking sector distortions increase direct and indirect costs to the
debtors: examples of these distortions include narrow restrictions on banks' op-
erations and services to clients (DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998). One
may argue that this "tax" applies equally to all energy ¯rms operating in a
given country, and not only to the RE producers represented in the model.
However, energy ¯rms in the conventional fossil fuel industry tend to be older
and more established than RET ¯rms, and may have greater means of using
legal loopholes and institutional weaknesses to their advantage. Especially in
regions where the economy depends on the income from the hydrocarbon ex-
traction, re¯ning and transportation industries, fossil fuel companies often have
privileged access to local ¯nancing. Government policy should aim at provid-
ing a clear legal and institutional framework to create a more e±cient banking
sector, and at enforcing the rules which are put in place.
The second issue regards the potential creditor evaluation costs to banks
f: the message is that better information on the available renewable energy
technologies will foster the sector's development, i.e. an increase in N. From
energy sector surveys and ¯rms' own accounts, it appears that renewable en-
ergy projects are at a particular disadvantage because of the short track record
of the new energy technologies, high up-front costs, and relatively low returns
spread out over long periods (Sonntag-O'Brien and Usher, 2004a,b). This im-
plies higher information costs to the ¯nancier in order to properly assess the
creditworthiness of the RE investment project. In addition, government policies
favouring fossil energy producers, such as guarantees and special ¯scal incen-
tives, make the evaluation of a RET project vis-µ a-vis a fossil fuel project even
less attractive and more costly for the ¯nancier.
The potential investors' evaluation costs can be reduced through public pol-
icy, e.g. by raising awareness and providing better information on new technolo-
gies and the risks and experiences connected with them. These costs can also be
lowered more indirectly by eliminating tax breaks and other incentives granted
to fossil fuel producers, or by setting up similar incentives for funding RE. The
latter policy option would have a more direct positive e®ect on the fraction of
creditworthy RE entrepreneurs Á. There is also increasing experience of shared
9RE project funding through public-private partnerships (PPPs), which can al-
low a cash-strapped government to mobilise complementary ¯nancing sources
by mixing its experience in public-sector infrastructure and the reduced risk of
partial governmental guarantees with private-sector commercial and ¯nancial
experience.10
Bank concentration reduces ¯nancing opportunities in countries with less de-
veloped economies and institutions (Beck, 2003), making banking sector compe-
tition another policy goal for better-functioning credit allocation, which would
a®ect both the distortional tax ¿ and the bank information costs f. An in-
teresting alternative to traditional commercial banking, which also contributes
to greater competition in ¯nancial intermediation, is venture capitalism (Rajan
and Zingales, 2001). Venture capitalism has emerged as an important source
of start-up investment ¯nance, which could mitigate some of the di±culties
involved with ¯nancing RE ¯rms. However, the lack of well-developed legal
frameworks and the generally greater political risk in developing and transition
countries are two factors which reduce the investment attractiveness for ven-
ture capitalists, who rely on clear and enforceable contract laws and accounting
standards to exercise their organisational rights and pro¯t guarantees and, ¯-
nally, their exit strategy.11 The better institutions mentioned earlier could not
only help increase competition in the traditional banking sector, but also at-
tract new types of relationship-based ¯nancial intermediaries able to optimally
evaluate credit potential.
Another policy implication is given by the primary resource-speci¯c costs ±:
possibilities for intervention in this area are numerous. Based on the premise
that di®erent types of energy resources create di®erent types of externalities,
primary resource-speci¯c costs could vary according to the principle of inter-
nalising externalities. The positive e®ect for RE ¯rms of lower net production
costs per unit ± also acts through the higher loan interest rate that they would
be willing to pay to lenders (see equation (8)). Bene¯ts of renewable energy
use can be priced in, for example by providing direct subsidies to RE ¯rms or
guaranteed feed-in costs into the national energy distribution grid for energy
produced using new technologies, a system which has been successfully imple-
mented for example in Germany. As economies of scale and learning e®ects
reduce the costs associated with RETs, making them more competitive with
fossil fuels, the incentives are gradually phased out.
In addition, a policy targeted at lowering production costs for RE would
have an indirect e®ect on RE ¯rms' access to bank ¯nancing. Government
subsidies a®ect ¯nancial intermediaries' decisions through implicit or explicit
backing of certain ¯rms or sectors, leading in fact to a credit market distortion
and more favourable lending terms (DemirgÄ u» c-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999).
Accordingly, in the model a subsidy decreasing ± would act as a government
guarantee, lowering information costs f for lenders and at the same time in-
10An example for a PPP is given by mezzanine funds, i.e. subordinated debt with a risk
level somewhere between equity and bank debt.
11Whether or not a venture capitalist or even a market-based ¯nancial system should be
preferred to a bank-based system is beyond the scope of this paper. For more on the debate
of bank-based vs. market-based ¯nancial intermediation, see Levine and Zervos (1998).
10creasing the fraction of creditworthy RE ¯rms Á, and therefore pushing down
the loan interest rate demanded by banks (see equation (11)).
Finally, public policy can intervene to reduce the external ¯nancing Z
needed by RE ¯rms, e.g. through grants and public facilities aimed at sharing
project development and transaction costs (World Bank, 2002; Matsukawa et
al., 2003; Sonntag-O'Brien and Usher, 2004a,b; UNEP, 2004). Governments in
transition and developing countries may however not award a high priority to
these policies, or simply not have the means to design and implement them.
Advice and loans provided by international institutions can and have already
been helpful, but risk creating situations of dependency and not being very
e®ective or e±cient in the long run.
4 Empirical evidence
The theoretical model presented above predicts that a better-developed ¯nan-
cial sector will have a positive impact on the development of the renewable
energy sector. The focus in particular has been on the importance of an un-
restricted banking sector and of low information costs on RETs for ¯nanciers
in order to foster the RE sector in transition and developing economies. This
section presents an empirical framework to test these e®ects.
4.1 Method and data description
There has so far been only anecdotal evidence on the role of commercial ¯nance
in the development of RE. The lack of a more systematic empirical analysis of
the correlation between ¯nancial sector and RE development is also due to
the data problem regarding the quanti¯cation of the RE sector, especially in
the developing world. The obstacles begin with the de¯nition of RE in o±cial
statistics: traditionally, hydropower|mostly provided by large plants|has de-
livered the lion's share of renewable energy in countries' energy production mix,
with other types of RE|when included|making up for barely a few percent
of the overall energy production. Recently however, some environmentalists
and policymakers have contended that large hydropower projects should not be
viewed as viable contributions to sustainable energy production, as they often
cause serious and substantial negative environmental and social externalities.
We consider these issues when testing the importance of ¯nancial interme-
diation for RET development by using two di®erent dependent variables as
proxies for RE sector development. The ¯rst, reshare, measures the overall
RE share|including all types of hydro|in net total electricity generation. In
a second series of estimations, we take into account the importance of large
hydropower in electricity generation and their possible distorting e®ect on the
results12 by using the non-hydro RE share in net total electricity generation as
12Most traditional, large hydro projects in the developing world have been co-¯nanced by
11the dependent variable (geoshare). This measure includes electricity produced
from geothermal, solar, wind, and wood and waste energy resources. The data
for both dependent variables is freely available from the U.S. Energy Informa-
tion Administration (EIA). The covariates include four di®erent indicators of
¯nancial sector development, and a vector of control variables, described below.
The data set provides an unbalanced panel for up to 118 non-OECD coun-
tries with observations for a maximum of 24 years (1980-2003). We perform
generalised least squares (GLS) regressions for the equation
Yit = ¯1 + ¯2Fit + ¯3Xit + !it; (16)
where Yit is the dependent variable (reshare or geoshare) in country i at time
t, Fit denotes the ¯nancial sector development variable, and Xit the vector
of control variables.13 The composite error term !it consists of the country-
speci¯c error component ²i and the combined cross-section and time series error
component uit, according to !it = ²i + uit.14
The ¯nancial sector development indicators are not direct measures of banks'
e±ciency in credit allocation, but rather di®erent proxies for ¯nancial interme-
diary development tested in the literature. The ¯rst variable, privcred, captures
the amount of credit provided by ¯nancial institutions to the private sector as
a share of GDP. It excludes credits issued by governments and development
banks. An unrestricted ¯nancial sector can be expected to account for a larger
share of lending to the private sector. In fact, this variable has been shown
by Levine et al. (2000) to be a reliable measure of ¯nancial intermediary de-
velopment, i.e. the ability of ¯nancial institutions to e±ciently mobilise and
allocate resources to pro¯table ventures. Earlier versions of the measure were
used for example in King and Levine (1993a,b) and Levine and Zervos (1998).
We expect privcred to correlate positively with the level of development of the
RE sector.
The second variable, commbank, measures the importance of commercial
banks' asset share versus that of the central bank. In more highly developed
and open economies, the commercial ¯nancial sector handles a greater share of
household savings than the central bank. Assuming that the commercial ¯nan-
cial sector is more e±cient than the public one in allocating credits, commbank
should positively correlate with RET development. This variable has also been
tested several times in the literature, e.g. in King and Levine (1993a,b) and
Levine et al. (2000).
The third variable, ¯ndep, is a general measure of ¯nancial sector develop-
ment commonly known as "¯nancial depth", i.e. liquid liabilities of the ¯nancial
multilateral ¯nancial institutions (MFIs) and the local governments, with little or no involve-
ment sought of commercial ¯nance (World Bank, 2003). The use of the overall RE share
may therefore not only distort the results on the importance of the ¯nancial sector for more
modern RETs, but in fact reverse them.
13Estimations were performed both with 1-year-lags for the ¯nancial indicators|as ¯nan-
cial sector changes are not expected to have immediate e®ects|and 4-year-averages for all
variables. For a detailed description of the variables and sources, see Appendix B.
14See for example Baltagi (2001) or Hsiao (2003) for an extensive discussion of panel data
analysis models.
12system (generally M2) divided by GDP, which has been widely used in the lit-
erature on ¯nance and growth since King and Levine (1993a,b). The present
variable is based on the more sophisticated measure developed in Levine et al.
(2000). The assumption is that the relative size of the ¯nancial intermediary
sector is positively correlated with the quantity and quality of the ¯nancial
services provided, and we would therefore expect a positive in°uence on the
development of RETs.
The fourth and ¯nal ¯nancial sector variable, ¯nunder, takes a di®erent
approach, measuring ¯nancial underdevelopment or repression as the ratio of
reserve holdings to liquidity. A high reserve ratio is expected to have a negative
impact on the amount of assets available for credit allocation and consequently
the development of RETs, since "a high coe±cient of required reserve for com-
mercial banks will force them to hold a greater amount of non-interest bearing
monetary reserves" (Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1992, p.25).
Our main control variable psreform describes the level of power sector reform
in developing and transition countries. It is based on a broad qualitative survey
by the World Bank conducted in 1998 (ESMAP, 1999) and takes on values from
0 (least reformed) to 6 (reforms in all relevant areas have been implemented).
The evaluation considers measures to create equal market opportunities for all
energy resource types and encourage private ¯rms' participation and competi-
tion. Hence, psreform is a proxy for government energy policies. As discussed
in the previous section, the institutional framework is a crucial element of ¯-
nanciers' information costs on RETs (i.e. f in the theoretical model), signalling
a government's commitment to levelling the playing ¯eld for energy providers
and thereby reducing uncertainty about future pro¯tability of a RE project.
Since there is no reliable data available on creditor evaluation costs in less de-
veloped economies, this crude proxy will have to su±ce. We expect a positive
impact of power sector reforms on the RE sector, particularly on the share of
non-hydro RE.
Several other control variables are included.15 O±cial development assis-
tance by multilaterals (oda) aims to control for the e®ect of multilateral donor
money, while foreign direct investment (fdi) and net domestic investment (inv)
capture general private investment in a country (inv being the more complete
measure, including portfolio investments and ¯nancial derivatives as well as
foreign and domestic capital and equity investment). Further variables include
regional and period dummies (for the 4-year average estimations); initial real
GDP per capita; and a measure of economic development (devind) ranging from
1 to 4 based on the World Bank classi¯cation of low, lower middle, middle, and
high income countries according to 2003 GNI. Finally, we control for the possi-
ble exogenous e®ects on RE development of the costs of non-renewable energy
resource production by including the average annual market price of crude oil.
If the price of the most common conventional fuel a®ects investment in alter-
native energy sources, we would expect a positive e®ect of an oil price increase
15Unfortunately, there is not enough cross-country data available on RE potential to provide
a useful control variable. However, we believe that this does not greatly bias our results given
the range of RETs considered.
13Table 1. Financial development and the share of renewable energy resources in total
net electricity generation in non-OECD countries












logfdi ¡0:67¤¤¤ ¡0:64¤¤¤ ¡1:06¤¤¤ ¡0:86¤¤¤ ¡0:912¤¤¤
(0.18) (0.18) (0.23) (0.24) (0.18)
devind ¡9:95¤¤¤ ¡8:48¤¤ ¡8:85¤¤ ¡10:71¤¤ ¡9:08¤¤
(3.63) (3.98) (3.73) (4.22) (4.25)
eefsudummy ¡24:13¤¤¤ ¡22:77¤¤¤ ¡20:89¤¤¤ ¡20:08¤¤ ¡13:98¤ ¡14:14¤
(-24.13) (8.16) (8.14) (8.86) (8.26) (8.33)
oilprice 0:02 0.01 ¡0:04 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
R2 0.22 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.14 0.14












psreform 0:54¤¤¤ 0:54¤¤¤ 0:53¤¤¤ 0:53¤¤¤ 0:44 0:45¤¤ 0:53¤¤¤ 0:44¤¤
(0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.27) (0.2) (0.18) (0.19)
logoda 0:27¤¤¤ 0:19¤¤¤ 0:18¤¤¤ 0:19¤¤¤
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
devind -0.18 ¡0:21
(0.54) (0.5)
eefsudummy ¡2:47¤¤ ¡2:44¤¤ ¡3:15 ¡2:52¤¤ ¡2:543¤¤¤
(1.02) (1.02) (2.15) (0.99) (0.97)
oilprice 0:00 0:01 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R2 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.13
N 1125 1125 1053 1053 1118 1352 1346 1346
Notes: All regressions are random-e®ects GLS on full sample panel of 118 non-OECD countries from
1980-2003 with 1-year-lags in ¯nancial indicators. Regressions were also performed for 4-year average
data, which yielded very similar results and are not reported here. Other control variables are not
listed as they proved insigni¯cant. Standard errors in parentheses. ¤, ¤¤, ¤¤¤ statistically signi¯cant
at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Joint signi¯cance tests strongly reject hypothesis of no
di®erence between covariates in all estimations. For detailed variable descriptions and sources see
Appendix B.
on the share of RE in power production.
4.2 Estimation results
It is of particular interest to observe the sign and statistical validity of the ¯nan-
cial sector coe±cients ¯2 rather than their actual magnitude, given the quality
of the data for the RE sector. The aim is to observe whether the development
of the RE sector is positively in°uenced by the ¯nancial intermediary sector,
and especially by the banking system.
14Table 1 reports the results for random-e®ects regressions on the full sample16
for RE share (panel A) and non-hydro RE share (panel B). It is apparent that
the four ¯nancial sector variables are statistically signi¯cant when regressed
on both measures of RE sector development, and that they are fairly robust
to controlling for other e®ects both regarding their statistical signi¯cance and
the magnitude of their coe±cients. ¯ndep and privcred generally prove more
reliable, while ¯nunder has the weakest explanatory power, with commbank
situated in between.
It is however interesting that the signs of the four coe±cients are consistently
opposite when estimating with reshare versus geoshare as dependent variables.
When considering non-hydro RE share (panel B), the signs correspond to those
predicted by the theory, namely that ¯nancial sector development has a posi-
tive e®ect on the development of RETs. When hydropower is included in the
estimations, the situation changes round completely, con¯rming the inherent
di±culty surmised above in including mostly MFI-¯nanced (large) hydro in the
sample. This hypothesis receives further support through the high signi¯cance
of the economic development indicator devind observed in panel A.17 If it is
true that development banks in the past favoured large hydro projects, then
we would indeed expect to ¯nd a negative relationship between economic de-
velopment and the overall RE share. The economic development e®ect loses
signi¯cance when considering only non-hydro RE (panel B).
Regarding the other variables in table 1, we ¯nd a signi¯cant and robust
positive e®ect of power sector reforms on the share of non-hydro RE (panel
B), con¯rming the hypothesis that policies aimed at levelling the playing ¯eld
for all energy types encourage the development of RETs (other than large hy-
dropower projects). For a certain institutional framework in the power sector,
the ¯nancial development coe±cients consistently show the expected signs with
a high level of signi¯cance.
It is also interesting to note the e®ect of including regional dummies in the
estimations (with Asia and Oceania being the omitted regional dummy). East-
ern European and former Soviet Union countries have a consistently lower share
of all types of RE, especially of non-hydro RE. This can be explained by the
decades of socialist energy policy favoring the use of fossil fuels in electricity
generation and energy production in general. The other regional dummies were
not statistically signi¯cant. Last but not least, the inclusion of oil prices had
no signi¯cant e®ect on the magnitude or error margin of the other variables.
With one exception, oil prices had the expected positive sign, but proved sta-
tistically insigni¯cant in both estimation series. World oil price °uctuations do
not appear to have had a noticeable in°uence on RE development during the
time period observed.
In sum, the results of the empirical analysis support the basic hypothesis
16Both random-e®ects and ¯xed-e®ects estimations were performed on all variables for the
lagged sample and the 4-year averages. As the Hausman test showed no clear advantage of
using ¯xed e®ects, only random-e®ects estimation results are shown. See Baltagi (2001) for
more details on the Hausman speci¯cation test.
17Initial real GDP per capita had a similar e®ect. For simplicity, only the results using the
economic development indicator are shown.
15from the theoretical model that ¯nancial intermediary development encour-
ages the growth of the RE sector, especially when limiting the estimations to
non-hydro RETs. The ¯ndings are also quite robust to the inclusion of other
covariates which could in°uence RE sector development. But further empirical
research is needed to corroborate these results, as they very likely su®er from
measurement errors due to the quality of the available RE data.
5 Conclusions
The paper examines the determinants of credit allocation to renewable energy
¯rms in developing and transition countries. It develops a multi-sector endoge-
nous growth model to explain the ¯nancing problems of renewable energy (RE)
projects in these countries. Growth in the model stems from the diversi¯cation
of the primary RE production sector, i.e. the use of a more varied range of
renewable energy technologies (RETs) in energy production. Energy produc-
tion today relies on exhaustible and polluting conventional fossil fuels, and a
larger share of alternative energy sources in primary energy production would
not only have positive environmental e®ects, but would also bring greater en-
ergy security for future generations, as RETs exploit domestic renewable energy
resources. Diversi¯cation in the use of RETs is hence assumed to be bene¯cial
for a sustainable energy sector.
Energy ¯rms in less developed economies are largely dependent on external
¯nancing to realise new projects; in turn, external ¯nancing in these countries
relies on the banking sector, as stock markets and venture capitalism are not
well enough established to provide large-scale funding. However, the underde-
velopment of the banking sector, in addition to speci¯c RE-sector problems such
as high up-front and information costs and long lead times, hamper the emer-
gence of RE entrepreneurs. The steady-state equilibrium solution yields several
results: less banking sector distortion and lower evaluation costs to potential
creditors will increase growth rates, while higher external ¯nancing needs by
the RE ¯rm will lower growth rates.
Several policy recommendations for the emergence of RETs are derived:
general banking sector development through creating better legal and institu-
tional frameworks, as well as the more targeted provision of information on new
energy technologies. Speci¯c measures aimed at reducing the relative price of
RE production through taxes or ¯xed feed-in prices (to include positive exter-
nalities) are also considered, as well as the merit of public-private partnerships
to lower project costs for generators and the perceived risk for ¯nanciers. In
short, there are many ways of levelling the playing ¯eld for new energy tech-
nologies. The subsidy option should however be a temporary instrument to
boost the development of a sustainable energy sector and future energy secu-
rity. As new energy technologies take o®, scale and learning e®ects will ensure
their market success.
The positive e®ect of ¯nancial sector development on the development of
16RETs found in the theoretical model is tested empirically. The results are en-
couraging: all four variables measuring ¯nancial intermediary development are
signi¯cant and have the expected signs. In addition, energy sector reforms also
have a signi¯cant positive e®ect. The results are fairly robust to the addition
of other control variables|including world oil prices, which appear to have no
impact on RE sector development.
The approach is a ¯rst attempt at modelling and empirically verifying the
¯nancing di±culties facing the renewable energy industry. The availability of
quality data on RE development and investment has so far hampered empirical
studies in this area; further work is needed to corroborate the results. An
interesting extension for future research is the role that ¯nancial intermediaries
play in the substitution of fossil fuels in favour of RE.
17A Appendix
Descriptive statistics of main variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
reshare 2497 47.53 34.67 0.01 100
geoshare 2497 1.21 4.08 0 40.18
¯ndep 2726 37.41 24.71 0.00 168.85
privcred 2607 25.55 22.56 0.00 151.77
commbank 3008 74.07 23.68 2.98 136.59
¯nunder 3069 26.55 128.44 ¡13:24 5017.639
psreform 115 2.04 2.09 0 6
oilprice 24 22.62 6.46 12.72 35.69
18B Appendix
Variables and sources
All data were collected for non-OECD countries (as of 1980|the recent OECD
members Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, Poland, and Slovakia were
included in the estimations) for the years 1980-2003 (where available).
Variable De¯nition Source
reshare Share of renewable energies|including hydro, wood and
waste, geothermal, solar, and wind|in net total electricity
generation
EIA
geoshare Share of non-hydro renewable energies|including geother-
mal, wind, solar, and wood and waste|in net total electric-
ity generation
EIA
¯ndep Financial depth measured by 100
¤(0:5
¤(M2i(t) + M2i(t ¡
1))=GDP(t)) where M2 is liquid liabilities (lines 34+35) and
GDP is line 99b
IFS
privcred Credit by ¯nancial institutions to the private sector as share
of GDP, measured by 100
¤((0:5
¤CREDIT(t)+CREDIT(t¡
1)))=GDP) with CREDIT being total private sector credit
allocations by deposit money banks and other ¯nancial in-
stitutions (lines 22d+42d) and GDP line 99b
IFS
commbank Commercial bank asset share versus central bank, measured
by 100
¤(DBA(t)=(DBA(t)+CBA(t))) where DBA is assets
of deposit money banks (lines 22a-d) and CBA is assets of
the central bank (lines 12a-d)
IFS
¯nunder Financial underdevelopment or repression measured by
100
¤(COMM(t)=M2(t)) where COMM is commercial bank
reserves (line 20) and M2 is liquid liabilities (lines 34+35)
IFS
oda O±cial development assistance and o±cial aid|
disbursements by multilaterals
OECD
fdi Foreign direct investment (line 78bed) IFS
inv Net sum investment in economy, including direct investment,
portfolio investment, ¯nancial derivatives, and other invest-
ment (line 78bjd)
IFS
cgdp Per capita real GDP in 1980 Penn World
Tables 6.1
devind Development indicator based on the World Bank classi¯ca-
tion of countries by income (2003 GNI) from low (1) to high
income (4)
World Bank
psreform Qualitative power sector reform indicator for 1998, ranging
from 0 (no reforms) to 6 (all relevant reforms implemented
in all areas)
ESMAP(1999)
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